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Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms'
provides that:
12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment.
This particular formulation is derived from paragraph 2(b) of
the Canadian Bill of Rights,' the relevant part of which declares
that:
No law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to,
(b) impose or authorize the imposition of cruel and unusual treat-
ment or punishment.
While paragraph 2 (b) is the immediate statutory predecessor to
section 12 of the Charter, the "cruel and unusual punishment" pro-
hibition is firmly grounded in the original English Bill of Rights of
1688.' The judgment of Mr. Justice Marshall in the United States
Supreme Court decision of Furman v. Georgia,4 a case which con-
t Of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
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1 Constitution Act, 1982, as enacted by the Canada Act, 1982, c. II (U.K.),
proclaimed in force 17 April 1982.
2 R.S.C. i97o , Appendix III.
3 I Will. & Mar. seSS. 2, c. 2.
4 4o8 U.S. 238 (1972). As Mr. Justice Marshall indicates, there is some dif-
ference of opinion amongst scholars as to which punishments were meant to
be prohibited. Macaulay in his HISTORY OF ENGLAND, Vol. II (1964), at
371, relating the clause to the Bloody Assizes, sees it as prohibiting barbarous
methods of punishment. The American legal scholar Anthony Granucci has
argued that the clause was a response primarily to the trial of Titus Oates
and prohibits, not barbarous methods of punishment, but penalties which
were excessive: A. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:"
The Original Meaning (1969) 57 CAL. L. REv. 839. Welling and Hipfner,
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sidered the meaning of the United States Constitution's Eighth
Amendment5 ban on cruel and unusual punishment, contains this
review of the common English antecedents of this clause:
The Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punish-
ments derives from English law. In 1583, John Whitgift, Archbishop
of Canterbury, turned the High Commission into a permanent ec-
clesiastical court, and the Commission began to use torture to extract
confessions from persons suspected of various offences. Sir Robert
Beale protested that cruel and barbarous torture violated Magna
Carta, but his protests were made in vain.
Cruel punishments were not confined to those accused of crimes,
but were notoriously applied with even greater relish to those who
were convicted. Blackstone described in ghastly detail the myriad of
inhumane forms of punishment imposed on persons found guilty of
any of a large number of offences. Death, of course, was the usual
result.
The treason trials of 1685 - the "Bloody Assizes" - which followed
an abortive rebellion by the Duke of Monmouth, marked the cul-
mination of the parade of horrors, and most historians believe that
it was this event that finally spurred the adoption of the English Bill
two Canadian legal scholars, have concluded that there is not sufficient evi-
dence to connect the cruel and unusual punishments clause with either the
Bloody Assizes or the trial of Titus Oates. Nor is there evidence which sup-
ports a distinction between barbarous methods of punishment and penalties
which are merely excessive. The only meaning which the evidence supports,
in their view, is that the clause prohibits unprecedented punishments, not
authorized by statute, and beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing Court:
B. Welling and C. A. Hipfner, Cruel and Unusual? Capital Punishment in
Canada (1976) 26 U. oF T.L.J. 55. Stan Berger, in The Application of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause under the Canadian Bill of Rights
(5 978) 24 McGill L.J. 161, the most recent Canadian commentary interpret-
ing the same evidence as that cited by Welling and Hipfner, concludes that
that evidence is sufficient to support Granucci's conclusion that the clause
was a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties.
Although the great majority of American legal scholars who have sought to
grapple with the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment have focused on
its English sources, a recent study has suggested that this is too restrictive.
This study suggests that as vital a source as was English intellectual and
political history, the European Philosophers of the Enlightenment, Voltaire,
Montesquieu and especially Beccaria were also important. They argue that
Beccaria's TREATISE ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1788), together with
the works on criminal law reform of these other great thinkers, provided the
philosophical basis for the principle of proportionality of punishment. Since
these works influenced American colonial leaders, the principle of propor-
tionality must necessarily be reflected in the Eighth Amendment: D. A.
Schwartz and J. Wishingrad, Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria,
and the Enlightenment: an Historical Justification for the Weems v. United
States Excessive Punishment Doctrine (1975) 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783. For
a criticism of this referential incorporation of Beccaria's views on proportion-
ality, see C. W. Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and
the Compelling case of William Rummel (s98o) 71 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMI-
NOLOGY 378.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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of Rights containing the progenitor of our prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments. The conduct of Lord Chief Justice Jef-
freys at those trials has been described as an "insane lust for cruelty"
which was "stimulated by orders from the King" (James II). The
assizes received wide publicity from Puritan pamphleteers and doubt-
less had some influence on the adoption of a cruel and unusual
punishments clause. But, the legislative history of the English Bill of
Rights of x689 indicates that the assizes may not have been as criti-
cal to the adoption of the clause as it is widely thought. After Wil-
liam and Mary of Orange crossed the Channel to invade England,
James II fled. Parliament was summoned into session and a com-
mittee was appointed to draft general statements containing "such
things as are absolutely necessary to be considered for the better
securing of our religion, laws and liberties." An initial draft of the
Bill of Rights prohibited "illegal" punishments, but a later draft
referred to the infliction by James II of "illegal and cruel" punish-
ments, and declared "cruel and unusual" punishments to be pro-
hibited. The use of the word "unusual" in the final draft appears to
be inadvertent.
This legislative history has led at least one legal historian to conclude
"that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Bill of Rights
of 1689 was, first, an objection to the imposition of punishments that
were unauthorized by statute and outside the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court, and second, a reiteration of the English policy
against disproportionate penalties," and not primarily a reaction to
the torture of the High Commission, harsh sentences or the assizes.
Whether the English Bill of Rights prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments is properly read as a response to excessive or
illegal punishments, as a reaction to barbaric and objectionable
modes of punishment, or as both, there is no doubt whatever that in
borrowing the language and in including it in the English Amend-
ment, our Founding Fathers intended to outlaw torture and other
cruel punishments.'
The Case Law
In the first fifteen years after the enactment of the Canadian Bill
of Rights, paragraph 2 (b) was argued in a significant number of
cases as the basis for invalidating particular punishments or pen-
alties. While these cases without exception rejected the argument,
there was no extensive discussion of the relevant principles which
ought to be brought to bear on the application of paragraph 2 (b).
Typical of what one judge has referred to as "the rather barren
approach" taken by these early decisions is that of R. v. Hatchwel'
6 Supra, note 4, at 316-20.
7 (1973) 14 C.C.C. (2d) 556 (B.C.C.A.).
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where the accused had argued that the sentence of preventive de-
tention imposed pursuant to having been found an habitual crim-
inal pursuant to section 688 of the Criminal Code' was cruel and
unusual punishment. This argument was disposed of by Robertson
J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in one paragraph:
Thirdly, it is submitted that a sentence of preventive detention is
"cruel and unusual treatment or punishment" within the meaning
of para. (b) of s. 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights: cruel because
there is no prescribed limit to its length - and I note that the same
is true of a term of life imprisonment - and unusual because a
precedent of precisely, or almost precisely, the same nature cannot
be found elsewhere; counsel did not, as he could not, go as far as to
submit that imprisonment in itself is cruel treatment or punishment
within the meaning of para. (b). I feel that I need say no more than
that I do not think that this submission can succeed.9
Other cases were content to give paragraph 2 (b) a strictly literal
meaning. Thus in R. v. Dick, Penner and Finnigan0 the Manitoba
Court of Appeal held that a sentence of whipping for rape under
section 136 of the Criminal Code1 ' [this section is now 144, and the
punishment by whipping was deleted in 1972], while possibly cruel,
did not constitute an unusual punishment.
[C]orporal punishment is not unusual in any sense of the word; in
some form or other almost everyone has received it. Discipline in
prisons, in the home, in the school is, to some extent, enforced by
corporal punishment. If not the most common, it is certainly one of
the most common of all forms of punishment.
12
Since 1975 the courts have been confronted with far more sub-
stantial arguments by counsel as to the proper interpretation of
paragraph 2 (b) and in a series of judgments dealing with the issues
of solitary confinement in prison, the minimum seven year term of
imprisonment for importation of a narcotic under the Narcotic Con-
trol Act13 and the death penalty have sought to articulate the relevant
principles and criteria which ought to be brought to bear on any
judicial inquiry under paragraph 2 (b). It is these cases which prop-
erly provide the focus for analysis in seeking to gauge the future
course of judicial developments under section 12 of the Charter.
8 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
9 Supra, note 7, at 564.
[1965] 1 C.C.C. 171 (MAN. C.A.).
'" S.C. 1953-54, c. 51.
12 Supra, note io, at 177.
13 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-i.
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Before undertaking such an analysis, however, it is appropriate to
consider judicial developments in the United States on the inter-
pretation of the Eighth Amendment. There are three reasons for
this. First because, as with paragraph 2 (b) of the Bill of Rights and
section 12 of the Charter, it traces its origins back to common Eng-
lish antecedents. Second, because American courts have over a
longer period and through more extensive litigation refined their
approach, and third, and perhaps most important, because one of
the key issues in the Canadian cases has been the relevance and
usefulness of the United States jurisprudence.
It is generally accepted that the leading United States authority
on the Eighth Amendment is the 1972 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Furman z'. Georgia which concerned the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty. Although all nine justices wrote
separate opinions, the judgment of Brennan J., one of the justices
in the majority in the case, is especially useful as containing a care-
ful review of previous decisions of the Supreme Court and seeking
to draw from them the principles which have been developed by
the Court in interpreting the Eighth Amendment. Brennan J.'s
judgment has been particularly influential with several of the Cana-
dian judges who have accepted the relevance of the American case
law.
Mr. Justice Brennan, drawing upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in Trop v. Dulles,4 saw the unifying principle of the Eighth
Amendment in this way:
"The basic concept underlying the [Clause] is nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
[Clause] stands to assure that this power be exercised within the
limits of civilized standards."
At bottom, then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause pro-
hibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The
State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for
their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is "cruel and
unusual," therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.',
Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded to derive from jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court a set of principles to focus a judicial inquiry on
whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity.
The primary principle is that a punishment must not be so severe
as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings. Pain, certainly,
14 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
1 Supra, note 4, at 270, Trop v. Dulles quotation from 356 U.S. at ioo.
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may be a factor in the judgment. The infliction of an extremely
severe punishment will often entail physical suffering... [e] ven
though "[ t] here may be involved no physical mistreatment, no prim-
itive torture," Trop v. Dulles ... severe mental pain may be inherent
in the infliction of a particular punishment.1 6
In the case of Trop v. Dulles, where the Court held that the
punishment of expatriation violated the Eighth Amendment, one
of the conclusions underlying that holding was its infliction of severe
mental pain. But, as Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out, it is not just
the presence of severe pain that has led American Courts to strike
down certain punishments.
The barbaric punishments condemned by history, "punishments
which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the iron
boot, the stretching of limbs, and the like," are, of course, "attended
with acute pain and suffering."... When we consider why they have
been condemned, however, we realize that the pain involved is not
the only reason. The true significance of these punishments is that
they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to
be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the
fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.
A second principle which Mr. Justice Brennan felt inherent in
the Eighth Amendment is that the State must not arbitrarily inflict
a severe punishment.
This principle derives from the notion that the State does not respect
human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a
severe punishment that it does not inflict upon others.18
The third principle identified by Mr. Justice Brennan is "that a
severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary so-
ciety... ."' The question under this principle is whether there are
objective indicators from which a court can conclude that contem-
porary society considers a severe punishment unacceptable. Accord-
ingly, the court's task is to review the history of a challenged punish-
ment and to examine society's present practices in respect to its use.
The final principle identified in Mr. Justice Brennan's judgment
is that a severe punishment must not be excessive:
A punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary:
The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport
16 Id., at 271.
17 Id., at 272-73.
Is Id., at 274.
19 Id., at 277.
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with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless in-
fliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less severe punishment
adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is in-
iflicted ... the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore ex-
cessive ....
Although the determination that a severe punishment is excessive
may be grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the
crime, the more significant basis is that the punishment serves no
penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment.20
Having identified the four principles, Mr. Justice Brennan went
on to explain how they were all interrelated.
There are, then, four principles by which we may determine whether
a particular punishment is "cruel and unusual." The primary prin-
ciple, which I believe supplies the essential predicate for the appli-
cation of the others, is that a punishment must not by its severity
be degrading to human dignity. The paradigm violation of this prin-
ciple would be the infliction of a torturous punishment of the type
that the Clause has always prohibited. Yet "[i] t is unlikely that any
State at this moment in history[,]" . . would pass a law providing
for the infliction of such a punishment. Indeed, no such punishment
has ever been before this Court. The same may be said of the other
principles. It is unlikely that this Court will confront a severe punish-
ment that is obviously inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion; no State
would engage in a reign of blind terror. Nor is it likely that this
Court will be called upon to review a severe punishment that is
clearly and totally rejected throughout society; no legislature would
be able even to authorize the infliction of such punishment. Nor,
finally, is it likely that this Court would have to consider a severe
punishment that is patently unnecessary; no State today would inflict
a severe punishment knowing that there was no reason whatever for
doing so. In short, we are unlikely to have occasion to determine that
a punishment is fatally offensive under any one principle.'
After reviewing the punishments which the Court had held to be
within the prohibition of the clause (twelve years in chains at hard
and painful labour, Weems v. United States;2 expatriation, Trop v.
Dulles;23 and imprisonment for being addicted to narcotics, Robin-
son v. California') Mr. Justice Brennan continued:
Each punishment, of course, was degrading to human dignity, but
of none could it be said conclusively that it was fatally offensive
20 Id., at 279-80.
- Id., at 281.
22 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
2 Supra, note 14-
S37o U.S. 66o (1962).
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under one or the other of the principles. Rather, these "cruel and
unusual punishments" seriously implicated several of the principles,
and it was the application of the principles in combination that sup-
ported the judgment. That, indeed, is not surprising. The function
of these principles, after all, is simply to provide means by which a
court can determine whether a challenged punishment comports
with human dignity. They are, therefore, interrelated, and in most
cases it will be their convergence that will justify the conclusion that
a punishment is "cruel and unusual." The test, then, will ordinarily
be a cumulative one: If a punishment is unusually severe, if there
is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substan-
tially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to
believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some
less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punish-
ment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not
inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted
of crimes.2"
In the American cases on the Eighth Amendment it is the cruelty
of the punishment rather than its unusualness which has been chosen
as the principal criterion by which its propriety should be gauged.
The courts have declined to give the word "unusual" a restricted
meaning. In Furman v. Georgia, Mr. Justice Marshall, in his his-
torical discussion of the clause, noted that in the original draft of
the English Bill of Rights, the words used were "illegal" and "cruel"
punishments. Adopting the reasoning of Anthony Granucci,26 the
final phraseology in the use of the word "unusual" must be laid
simply to chance and sloppy draftsmanship. Chief Justice Burger,
although dissenting on the issue of whether the death penalty came
within the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment, agreed that "[t] he
term 'unusual' cannot be read as limiting the ban on 'cruel' punish-
ments or somehow expanding the meaning of the term 'cruel'"7
Chief Justice Warren, in the earlier case of Trop v. Dulles clearly
indicated that the approach of the Supreme Court was to examine
"the particular punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition
against inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of
meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual'"'
In Furman v. Georgia the majority (of which Brennan J. was a
member) concluded that the death penalty statutes before the court
in that case violated the Eighth Amendment. The common de-
25 Supra, note 4, at 282.
26 Supra, note 4.
- Supra, note 4, at 381.
2s Supra, note 14, at 10o.
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nominator in the separate judgments of the majority was that the
sentence of death authorized under the statutes before the court,
in light of the absence of standards to guide judges or juries, and
in light of its infrequent imposition, was arbitrarily and capriciously
applied and therefore ceased to further any state purpose. In re-
sponse to the decision in Furman, many of the states whose death
penalty statutes were thereby rendered unconstitutional rewrote
them. In 1976 the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,' Jurek v.
Texas" and Proffitt v. Florida" ruled on a number of these revised
statutory schemes. The plurality of the court held that the death
penalty statutes, to be valid, specified standards for sentencing au-
thorities, whether they be judges or juries, were necessary so as to
eliminate arbitrary results, and further that it was necessary that the
sentences make particularized findings regarding the defendant's
character or circumstances of the crime. Although Brennan J. was
in the minority in the Gregg and associated decisions, maintaining
his view that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se, the
tests which he developed in Furman were adopted with some modi-
fication by the plurality of the court in Gregg. The judgment of the
court restated those tests in this way:
[A] n assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of
a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment.... [T]his assessment does not call for a subjective
judgment. It requires, rather, that we look to objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.
But our cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards
of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A
penalty must also accord with "the dignity of man," which is the
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.1
2
According to the plurality in Gregg the inquiry into exclusiveness
had two aspects. Although the Courts could not invalidate a cate-
gory of penalties because it deemed less severe penalties adequate to
serve the ends of penology, the sanction imposed "cannot be so
totally without penological justification that it results in gratuitous
infliction of suffering.""
The first of the Canadian cases which raised the interpretation
of paragraph 2 (b) in full-blown form and the only one which has
29 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
30 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
31 428 U.S. 242 (1976)_
32 Supra, note 29, at 174.
3 Id., at x84.
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been considered by the Supreme Court of Canada, like Furman
and Gregg, concerned the death penalty. In R. v. Miller and Cock-
riell4 the British Columbia Court of Appeal was faced with the
argument that the death penalty provisions of the Criminal Code
for capital murder violated paragraph 2(b). The majority judg-
ment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in rejecting this
argument, took a very narrow approach to the issue. The appellants
had sought to rely upon the American decisions, including Furman
v. Georgia but the majority rejected the relevance of these cases
because of the different approach which the United States Supreme
Court adopted in interpreting the Constitution of the United States
as compared to construing an Act of Parliament, and also because
"a meaning given by the Supreme Court of the United States to a
phrase in the Constitution, however correct it may be in that context
.. throws little, if any, light on the meaning of the same phrase in
our Bill of Rights.""
Robertson J.A., preferring a conjunctive interpretation of para-
graph 2 (b) whereby punishment must be both "cruel" and "un-
usual", and after accepting for the sake of argument that hanging
is cruel punishment, concluded that:
(i) [P]unishment by death for murder is not unusual in the ordi-
nary and usual meaning of the word; (2) Parliament, when it en-
acted the amendments to the Code, [in 1973] was of the opinion
that the punishment was not an unusual one and the Court cannot
substitute its opinion (if it is different) for Parliament's; and (3)
Parliament wished its enactment to prevail and by necessary impli-
cation excluded the application of s. 2 of the Bill of Rights.6
Mr. Justice McIntyre, in dissent, took a much broader view. He
rejected the majority's argument that the American cases were not
of any assistance to the court since the constitutional basis of the
relationship between the courts and the Legislature is fundamentally
different in the United States and the principles derived from those
cases could not be imported into Canada "to assist in the resolution
of a peculiarly Canadian constitutional problem". 7 He traced the
common heritage of the Eighth Amendment and paragraph 2 (b),
the English Bill of Rights, and stated therefore that the framers of
the American Constitution, in adopting the language of the English
-(1975) 24 C.C.C. (2d) 401 (B.C.C.A.).
35 Id., at 452.
36 Id., at 456.
37 Id., at 46o.
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Bill of Rights in the Eighth Amendment, were adopting English
law "which had become or was to become Canadian law and con-
sideration of this question and its mention in the Canadian Bill of
Rights involves the introduction of no foreign concept into our
Canadian system."' McIntyre J. also was of the view that the
Canadian Bill of Rights had introduced some element of judicial
review of legislation into the Canadian constitutional system and
therefore, while arguments based upon the entirely different nature
of the American constitutional division of powers might have had
considerable force before 1960, they were no longer so compelling.
McIntyre J. concluded his review of the relevance of the United
States' decisions in this way:
I am fully aware that American authority does not bind me... but
I have found it helpful in seeking principles upon which this matter
should be considered in a civilized society."
On the issue of whether the punishment of death must be, as the
majority decision concluded, both cruel and unusual, McIntyre J.
having referred to the scholarly literature and the United States
case law, came to a different conclusion:
[I]t is permissible and preferable to read the words 'cruel' and
'usual' [in section 2(b) of the Bill of Rights] disjunctively so that
cruel punishments however usual in the ordinary sense of the term
could come within the proscription. The term 'unusual' refers in my
view not simply to infrequency of imposition... but to punishments
unusual in the sense that they are not clearly authorized by law, not
known in penal practice or not acceptable by community standards.4 °
McIntyre J.'s judgment then proceeded to identify the standards
or tests to be applied in determining whether capital punishment
(or any other punishment or treatment) violated paragraph 2 (b) :
It would not be permissible to impose a punishment which has no
value in the sense that it does not protect society by deterring crim-
inal behaviour or serve some other social purpose. A punishment
failing to have these attributes would surely be cruel and unusual.
... Furthermore.. . I am of the opinion it would be cruel and un-
usual if it is not in accord with public standards of decency and
propriety, if it is unnecessary because of the existence of adequate
alternatives, if it cannot be applied upon a rational basis in accord-
s Id., at 461.
39 Id., at 465.
,0 Id.
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ance with ascertained or ascertainable standards, and if it is excessive
and out of proportion to the crimes it seeks to restrain.41
Professor Stan Berger42 has summarized the McIntyre five-fold
test to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual as the
social purpose, the public decency, the arbitrariness, the necessity
and the disproportionality tests.
McIntyre J. concluded that on all the tests the punishment of
death was "cruel and unusual". In his view there was no evidence to
show that it had a special deterrent effect which could not be
equally served by lesser punishments. Even if such an effect could be
shown, in his view capital punishment was no longer accepted as a
legitimate and acceptable punishment by a substantial majority of
the community. He pointed to the fact that there had been no
execution in Canada since 1962 and its lack of use amounting al-
most to de facto abolition indicated that it was not in accord with
popular feeling and the standards of decency recognized by the
community. He further concluded that it was not shown to be nec-
essary for the safety or proper regulation of the community or for
the protection of those responsible for the maintenance of law and
order in the community and that the sentence of life imprisonment
was fully capable of protecting the public and was not shown to be
any less effective in deterring attacks on police officers and prison
guards. McIntyre J. found that the evidence as to the actual im-
position of capital punishment, which prior to the de facto sus-
pension of the death penalty in 1962 had been visited upon only a
few of those who qualified for it, indicated that it had been arbi-
trarily applied and arbitrarily witheld. Finally McIntyre J. con-
cluded that the death penalty was an excessive punishment in that
its severity far exceeded what is necessary to restrain the evils of
violent crime.
In the Supreme Court of Canada,4" Ritchie J., writing for the
majority, upheld the majority view of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal and in so doing he supplemented the reasons of Robertson
J.A. Ritchie J., endorsing the approach of Martland J. in the Burn-
shine" case that section 2 of the Bill of Rights did not create new
rights but only confirmed existing ones, held that section 2 was
properly to be read in light of section I. According to Ritchie J. the
41 Id., at 468.
42 Berger, supra, note 4.
43 (1976) 3x C.C.C. (2d) 177.
- R. v. Burnshine (1974) 15 C.C.C. (2d) 505 (S.C.C.).
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declaration of the right of the individual not to be deprived of life
in paragraph I (a) was qualified by the words "except by due
process of law". Therefore, "at the time when the Bill of Rights
was enacted there did not exist and had never existed in Canada
the right not to be deprived of life in the case of an individual who
had been convicted of 'murder punishable by death' by the duly
recorded verdict of a properly instructed jury".45
Under this interpretation paragraph 2 (b) could not qualify any
punishment which was imposed pursuant to due process of law
because such punishment did not violate any existing right recog-
nized by paragraph i (a). Mr. Justice Ritchie further concluded
that the retention by Parliament of the death penalty as part of the
Criminal Code after the enactment of the Bill of Rights constituted
strong evidence that Parliament did not intend the word "punish-
ment" in paragraph 2(b) to preclude the death penalty for a con-
victed murderer. Again, applying the argument of the British Co-
lumbia Court of Appeal, Ritchie J. saw the absence of a non
obstante clause as evidence of Parliamentary intention that there
was no conflict between the Bill of Rights and the death penalty.
As Professor Berger has acutely observed:
The irony is that the absence of a non obstante clause was being
used by the court to render operative a punishment which might
otherwise violate section 2 (b), when the opening words of section 2
state this to be the very purpose of including such a clause.4
Having concluded on these grounds that paragraph 2(b) was
not intended to include punishment by death for murder, it was not
necessary for Ritchie J. to rule on the proper interpretation of
"cruel and unusual punishment". The Court did however, albeit
obiter, indicate its view that the majority view of the Court of
Appeal was the appropriate approach and that any punishment had
to meet the test of being both "cruel" and "unusual", and that since
the death penalty had been a feature of the criminal law of Canada
ever since Confederation, it cannot be said to have been an unusual
punishment in the ordinary accepted meaning of that word. In
similar fashion Ritchie J. endorsed the approach of the Court of
Appeal majority judgment in rejecting the applicability of the
United States decisions, concluding that the Canadian Bill of Rights
and the United States Constitution "differ so radically in their pur-
" Supra, note 43, at i96.
46 Supra, note 4, at 170.
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pose and content that judgments rendered in interpretation of one
are of little value in interpreting the other."4
Chief Justice Laskin, writing for himself, Dickson and Spence JJ.,
while concurring with the majority that the death penalty did not
violate paragraph 2(b), did so on an entirely different basis. He
rejected the subordination of section 2 to section I and the argu-
ment that the proper interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights
can be discerned from the course of Parliamentary legislation with
the possibility, sanctioned by the majority, of implied repeal without
the presence of an non obstante clause. The Chief Justice also saw
the relevance of American decisions in the proper interpretation of
paragraph 2 (b) in a different light than the majority. While at one
point in his judgment expressing his approval of their relevance in
somewhat muted terms ("the various judgments in the Supreme
Court of the United States, which I would not discount as being
irrelevant here"1 8 ) the Chief Justice in later parts of his judgment
analyzes the issue before the Court within the context of the prin-
ciples formulated by Mr. Justice Brennan in the Furman decision.
On the issue of whether the proper approach to paragraph 2 (b)
was a disjunctive or conjunctive approach the Chief Justice sug-
gested that the American cases lent support to the view that the
words are not to be treated as conjunctive, requiring that punish-
ments be both cruel and unusual, but rather "as interacting ex-
pressions colouring each other, so to speak, and hence, to be con-
sidered together as a compendious expression of a norm."' In
adopting this approach, Laskin C.J.C. reasoned that this was "in line
with the duty of the Court not to whittle down the protections of
the Canadian Bill of Rights by a narrow construction of what is a
quasi-constitutional document."5 These words are of particular sig-
nificance given the status of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
On the appropriate test to be applied in the determination of
whether a punishment violated paragraph 2 (b), the Chief Justice
clearly affirmed that while originally the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause may have been aimed at methods of punishment, it
cannot reasonably be limited to methods but may include punish-
ments which are disproportionate and excessive. As he stated:
47 Supra, note 43, at 198.




[T]here are social and moral considerations that enter into the
scope and application of section 2 (b). Harshness of punishment and
its severity in consequences are relative to the offence involved but,
that being said, there may still be a question (to which history too
may be called in aid of its resolution) whether the punishment pre-
scribed is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency. This is not
a precise formula for s. 2(b), but I doubt whether a more precise
one can be found."
Having said this, the Chief Justice then proceeded to deal with
the appellants' arguments within the context of the criteria articu-
lated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Furman v. Georgia as restated by
Mr. Justice McIntyre; that the death penalty was unusually severe
and hence degrading to human dignity; that it was arbitrarily im-
posed; that it was not acceptable to a large segment of the popula-
tion and that it was excessive in that it cannot be shown to have had
any deterrent effect on murder that could not be realized by less
drastic punishment. The Chief Justice rejected the argument that
in the Canadian context the death penalty was arbitrarily imposed,
since the death penalty was, in contradistinction to the statutes
under challenge in Furman v. Georgia, a mandatory one. It is im-
portant to note that the rejection here of the arbitrariness test was
not as to the appropriateness of the test but rather its applicability
to the penalty under attack in Miller and Cockriell.
The Chief Justice was more sweeping in his rejection of the argu-
ment that the death penalty was unacceptable to a large segment of
the population on the basis that this would be asking the court to
define and apply paragraph 2(b) by a statistical measure of ap-
proval or disapproval of the death penalty. The Chief Justice went
on to consider at some length the submissions based upon severity
and excessiveness accepting as a premise that if these were made
out then they would be sufficient to sustain the attack on the death
penalty as cruel and unusual punishment. In the event, however,
the Chief Justice concluded that the death penalty did not conflict
with these principles. The primary ground for this conclusion was
that the appellants had relied upon the argument that the purposes
of punishment in relationship to the crime of murder of policemen
and prison guards could be equally well served by a less drastic
punishment such as life imprisonment. They argued and presented
evidence designed to show that there was no convincing proof of
general deterrence as far as murder was concerned by reason of
the imposition of capital punishment. The Chief Justice rejected
51 Supra, note 42, at 183.
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this argument on two grounds. First, he was of the view that the
burden of proof was not, as the appellants had argued, and as Mr.
Justice McIntyre had accepted, upon the Parliament of Canada to
show that capital punishment was an effective deterrent; second, in
assessing the issue of purposes of punishment it was not proper to
limit the enquiry to one of general deterrence. Parliament could
legitimately have regard to retribution or to the social outrage that
may reasonably find expression in a penal policy of a mandatory
death penalty for what the community regards as the most out-
rageous types of murder. Furthermore, there was a legitimate social
purpose in protecting police officers and prison guards in relation to
prisoners already serving life sentences for whom the death penalty
would operate as a deterrent. 5'
The second case to consider in depth the meaning of paragraph
2 (b) is that of McCann v. The Queen" in which a group of prison-
ers at the British Columbia Penitentiary sought a declaratory judg-
ment in the Federal Court of Canada that their indefinite detention
under conditions of solitary confinement in the British Columbia
Penitentiary constituted cruel and unusual punishment and there-
fore could not lawfully be authorized by subsection 2.30(I) of the
Penitentiary Service Regulations 4 (the provision which permits the
Warden to place a prisoner in administrative segragation for the
good order and discipline of the institution). At the time of the
McCann case only the decision of the British Columbia Court in
Miller and Cockriell had been rendered. The prisoner/plaintiffs in
the McCann case urged that Mr. Justice McIntyre's criteria were
the appropriate ones to apply. Mr. Justice Heald, while he acceded
to the view that the terms "cruel" and "unusual" were to be viewed
disjunctively as a compendious term, proceeded to deal with the
terms conjunctively, first characterizing the treatment of the prison-
ers in the segregation unit as "cruel", then as "unusual". The pri-
mary basis for Heald J.'s conclusion was that, based on the evidence
of the expert witnesses and the admission of the Director of the Peni-
tentiary, the treatment served no positive penal purpose. Moreover,
Mr. Justice Heald went on to state that:
52 Id., at 189-9 o . For further comment on the Miller and Cockriell case, see
Berger, supra, note 4; W. S. Tarnopolsky, Just Desserts or Cruel and Unusual
Treatment or Punishment? (1975) 10 OTT. L. REV. s; J. S. Leon, Cruel and
Unusual Punishment: Sociological Jurisprudence and the Canadian Bill of
Rights (1978) 36 U. T. FAC. L. REV. 222.
5- (1975) 29 C.C.C. (2d) 337 (F.C.T.D.).
54 Now s. 40 SOR/79-625.
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[Elven if it served some positive penal purpose, I still think the
treatment... would be cruel and unusual because it is not in accord
with public standards of decency and propriety, since it is unneces-
sary because of the existence of adequate alternatives. 5
In the McCann case the prisoners conceded that under appro-
priate circumstances it was a legitimate penal purpose to segregate
certain prisoners but argued and offered evidence that the purpose
could be fulfilled without inflicting the gratuitous suffering and
unnecessary rigour which existed in the solitary confinement unit at
the British Columbia Penitentiary. Heald J. accepted this argu-
ment, finding that "adequate alternatives do exist which would
remove the 'cruel and unusual' aspects of solitary while at the same
time retaining the necessary security aspects of dissociation.""
Though evidence had also been offered and argument presented
that the confinement of the prisoners was arbitrary in that it had
been applied other than in accordance with ascertained or ascer-
tainable standards, Heald J. did not refer to this test in his judg-
ment. He did however bolster his conclusion that the treatment of
the prisoners in the segregation was unusual by finding that even
given the restricted meaning ascribed to that phrase by the majority
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Miller and Cockriell,
that is, its ordinary and natural meaning as defined by the diction-
ary, certain aspects of the regime came within that definition. In
this respect he compared the conditions at the British Columbia
Penitentiary with those existing in other Canadian segregation units.
The issue of whether the conditions of solitary confinement in the
British Columbia Penitentiary constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment arose again for decision in a rather different way in the sub-
sequent case of R. v. Bruce, Wilson and Lucas.57 That case involved
criminal charges of, inter alia, unlawful confinement brought
against three prisoners, including one who had been a plaintiff in
the McCann case, who had taken hostages inside the penitentiary
at a time when they were in the prison population. Their defence
was that of necessity: that they honestly believed that they were
about to be placed back in solitary confinement and took hostages
as the lesser evil to avoid the greater evil of being placed in confine-
ment amounting to the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment
55 Supra, note 53, at 368. For a comprehensive Review of the issue of Solitary
Confinement see M. Jackson, PRISONERS OF ISOLATION SOLITARY CONFINE-
MENT IN THE CANADIAN PENITENTIARY (1983).
56 Id., at 370.
57 (1977) 36 C.C.C. (2d) 158 (B.C.S.C.).
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or treatment. Mr. Justice Toy, rendering judgment after the Su-
preme Court of Canada decision in Miller and Cockriell, declined
to follow the Heald judgment in McCann. Toy J. was of the opin-
ion that the treatment in solitary confinement was neither cruel nor
unusual according to the dictionary definition of those words. Hav-
ing thus concluded, Toy J. proceeded, however, to apply to the
overall conditions in solitary confinement the approach and formula
construing paragraph 2 (b) adopted by Chief Justice Laskin in
Miller and Cockriell, "in the absence of any other guide from the
majority judgment".' That formula he understood as involving a
consideration of whether the punishment prescribed is so excessive
as to outrage standards of decency. Applying that formula, after
noting that:
Canadian society has not had to concern itself with what goes on
behind the prison walls, and unlike the subject of capital punish-
ment, there have not been made apparent any discernible guidelines
that would indicate to me what the current standard of public
decency is.59
Toy J. concluded that the people generally admitted to solitary
confinement under administrative segregation are not "subjected to
a harshness so severe that public decency dictates that the courts
should decide that it be stopped.""0 As in the McCann case Toy J.
had before him evidence concerning the existence of alternative
measures to the solitary confinement regime which would ensure
that the security and good order of the institution would not be
undermined. However he dismissed that evidence as irrelevant since
in his view this test had not found favour in any of the judgments
of the Supreme Court of Canada. This part of Mr. Justice Toy's
judgment is most suspect since, as I have sought to explain, the
Chief Justice, while concluding that the appellants in Miller and
Cockriell had not sufficiently discharged the onus upon them to
prove that life imprisonment was an adequate alternative to capital
punishment having regard not just to deterrence but also retributive
purposes of punishment, clearly signalled his acceptance of the ex-
cessive punishment test.
The fourth case, which concludes this survey of recent Canadian
case law on paragraph 2 (b), is R. v. Shand61 where Judge Borins,
58 Id., at 169.
-9 Id., at i 70.
60 Id.
61 (1976) 29 C.C.C. (2d) 199 (ONT. Co. CT.).
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in considering the application of paragraph 2 (b) to the minimum
mandatory sentence for importation of a narcotic under the Nar-
cotic Control Act,6 2 applied the tests developed by Mr. Justice Mc-
Intyre. Judge Borins concluded that:
In relation to the crime committed, the person who committed it,
the nature, quantity and value of the drug involved, the current
range of sentences for closely related offences, the sentences provided
for closely related offences in the Food and Drugs Act and sentences
for comparable crimes in other jurisdictions, a term of imprison-
ment for seven years is unusually excessive punishment.... In my
view a compulsory sentence of seven years for a non-violent crime
imposed without consideration for the individual history and back-
ground of the accused is so excessive that it "shocks the conscience"
and because of its arbitrary nature fails to comport with human
dignity.... I appreciate the need to deter potential offenders from
increasing the supply of narcotic substances in Canada. However, I
am of the opinion that this element of general deterrence is provided
by the provision of a maximum penalty of life imprisonment....
Finally, even assuming some deterrent value, a compulsory sentence
of seven years in this case is completely unnecessary because it serves
no positive penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punish-
ment. The existence of adequate alternatives, absent the mandatory
sentence of seven years, enable the Court to fulfil the legitimate
objects of the criminal law.6 3
In Shand Judge Borins did not hold that the seven year manda-
tory minimum was cruel and unusual punishment in all cases of
importation. He held that it was in the particular case before him
and therefore declined to apply that sentence.
On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed Judge Borins.64
In so doing, however, the court, while expressing a need for caution
in light of the then pending appeal before the Supreme Court of
Canada of the Miller and Cockriell case, accepted as appropriate
several of the McIntyre tests. The court stated:
Therefore, we are prepared to accept that the so-called "dispropor-
tionality principle".. . has relevance to what is cruel and unusual
punishment, but it is a principle that needs to be developed in the
Canadian context of our constitution, customs and jurisprudence.
In this development great assistance can be obtained from the Amer-
ican precedents, across their rather broad spectrum, and to a lesser
extent, from some of the articles in the American periodicals....
As developed during the argument on whether the words "cruel
and unusual" should be read conjunctively or disjunctively, it be-
62 Supra, note 13.
63 Supra, note 61, at 234.
(1976) 30 C.C.C. (2d) 23 (ONT. C.A.).
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came apparent that there is a "core meaning" to the phrase "cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment". It has yet to be distilled and
enunciated in Canada. In provincial Courts of Appeal, that process
will best be carried out on a case by case basis.
Assuming that disproportionality is a matter to be considered,...
In our view a minimum sentence of seven years for importing a drug
contrary to the Act is not so disproportionate to the offence that the
prescribed penalty is cruel and unusual. The drug problem in Can-
ada is still of major proportions....
This type of national evil requires the opinion of Parliament as to
appropriate penalties, not that of individual Judges."'
The Court of Appeal looked to some of the American cases and
in fact found as the most persuasive the New York decision of The
People v. Broadie66 in which statutory minimum sentences for drug
offences were upheld against challenges based on the Eighth Amend-
ment. While accepting the disproportionality test, the Court of Ap-
peal rejected Judge Borin's application of the arbitrariness test based
on the pattern of prosecutorial discretion. The evidence before
Judge Borins had shown that in Ontario relatively few charges were
laid under the importation section. He compared the fact that there
were five times the number of convictions for importation in Quebec
than there were in Ontario, with only about one-third the number
of total narcotic convictions then in Ontario. The Court of Appeal
affirmed that in its judgment the Supreme Court of Canada decision
in R. v. Smythe67 had immunized prosecutorial discretion from
challenge under the Bill of Rights.
Changes in the Law Introduced by Section i of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms
Section 12 uses the identical language in phrasing the right pro-
tected by section 12 as did paragraph 2(b) of the Bill of Rights.
A number of submissions were made to the Parliamentary Com-
mittee considering the Charter, recommending that the words be
changed to read "cruel or unusual" to make it clear that the dis-
junctive approach would prevail in any future litigation. Other
submissions suggested that Canada adopt the language of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 5 of which
reads:
65 Id., at 37-39.
66 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (N.Y.C.A. 1975).
67 (197) 3 C.C.C. (2d) 366.
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No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.6s
Interestingly enough, the original Bill introduced in 1959 of the
Canadian Bill of Rights had used this language which was, however,
replaced by the "cruel and unusual punishment or treatment" for-
mulation. The decision of the Privy Council in Runyowa v. Regi-
nam suggests, however, that the cruel and unusual punishment
formulation may encompass more than the language embodied in
the United Nations Declaration. In that case a challenge had been
made to a mandatory death penalty imposed on two young men for
setting a fire. The challenge was based on a provision in the South-
ern Rhodesia Constitution which was cast in the language of the
Universal Declaration. Reliance was made upon United States
authority supporting the principle of disproportionality and the
Privy Council held the U.N. form of wording was aimed at the
type or mode of punishment but, unlike the U.S. formulation, was
not designed to permit any inquiry into the appropriateness or ex-
cessiveness of a punishment for a particular offence.
On the first issue of whether the conjunctive or disjunctive ap-
proach will prevail in future cases, I would suggest that the fact
that Parliament continued to use the same language in section 12
as in paragraph 2(b) of the Bill of Rights cannot be taken as re-
solving the matter in favour of a conjunctive approach. It is quite
clear that the courts have split on this issue and it is equally clear
that those judges who favoured the conjunctive approach also
favoured a narrow construction of paragraph 2 (b) and a rejection
of the relevance of the American authorities principally on the
basis that the nature of the United States Constitution was radically
different from that of the Canadian Bill of Rights. A strong argu-
ment can now be made that the entrenchment of the Charter of
Rights brings the status of rights in the Charter in much closer
approximation to those rights guaranteed in the United States Con-
stitution and therefore the grounds adopted by the majority of the
Supreme Court in Miller and Cockriell for distinguishing the rele-
vance of the United States approach are no longer cogent. Quite
apart from this point, it is further suggested that the majority de-
cision of Mr. Justice Ritchie in Miller and Cockriell, premised as
it is on the frozen rights theory, the subordination of paragraph
- Resolution 217A (III), United Nations General Assembly, December io,
1948.
- [1966] 1 ALL E.R. 633.
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2 (b) to section I and the possibility of implied repeal of the Bill of
Rights does not reflect an appropriate starting point for a proper
interpretation of section 12 of the Charter of Rights.
Section 12 of the Charter is not subordinated to the provisions of
section 7 which is the modified successor to paragraph I (a) and
which guarantees the right not to be deprived of life, liberty and
security of the person except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice (as opposed to due process of law). Rather,
both section 7 and section 12 are qualified by section I which sub-
jects all rights in the Charter to "such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society". The survival of Ritchie J.'s analysis in Miller and Cock-
riell that a punishment cannot be challenged under the cruel and
unusual punishment clause so long as it is imposed through due
process of law (or in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice) would require the conclusion that so long as a punishment
is so imposed it constitutes a reasonable limit prescribed by law.
Such a conclusion carries its own refutation because it gives no
independent meaning to section I. If the principles of fundamental
justice were intended to have the overriding qualifying effect which
this argument would require it would have been easy enough for
Parliament to have said so. Quite clearly section i means something
other than the qualifying words of section 7. Paralleling the demise
of this part of Ritchie J.'s analysis is the undermining of the concept
of implied repeal by the explicit provisions of the Charter in section
33 which not only provide for the non obstante clause (as did the
Bill of Rights) but limit the duration of such a clause.
It is the writer's judgment that Chief Justice Laskin's view in the
Miller and Cockriell case that a broad approach should be taken
to the cruel and unusual punishment clause "in line with the duty
of the Court not to whittle down the protections... of what is a
quasi-constitutional document"7 is more in keeping with the en-
trenchment of the clause in section 12 of the Charter. The elevation
of Mr. Justice McIntyre to the Supreme Court of Canada and the
other significant changes in the composition of Canada's ultimate
court of appeal suggest that future litigation will focus on the Mc-
Intyre-Laskin tests and that they will be subjected to a process of
refinement in the Canadian context.
Some guidance in terms of the areas in which the law may de-
velop can be gathered from the American experience where the
71 Supra, note 43.
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primary focus for the application of the Eighth Amendment has
been in the prison context." It is here that the courts have used the
Eighth Amendment as a basis for ensuring that minimum standards
of decency and civilized behaviour are observed. There have been
numerous successful challenges to conditions of solitary confinement
overcrowding, unsanitary conditions and other situations where the
courts have felt that the practices not only contravened elemental
conditions of decency but also could not be justified on any legiti-
mate penal purpose. While the original focus of much of the litiga-
tion was on particular prison practices such as solitary confinement,
the more recent case law has focussed on the so-called "totality of
conditions" in which some United States courts have held that prison
conditions and practices which might not be unconstitutional if
viewed individually can, when viewed as a whole, make confine-
ment cruel and unusual punishment. 2
The focussing of section 12 of the Charter on prison conditions
and practices would be particularly appropriate given that typically
such practices and conditions are not specifically prescribed by Par-
liament but are rather applied through the interpretation of very
broadly drafted legislative provisions which are made specific
through administrative policy-making. Judicial monitoring of such
practices against the standard of section 12 would therefore involve
the courts not in the overriding of clearly expressed legislative in-
tention but rather in the superintendency of decision-making which
has always been the most immunized from public scrutiny. The
71 For detailed commentaries on the application of the Eighth Amendment to
prison conditions, see R. G. Singer, Confining Solitary Confinement: Con-
stitutional Arguments for a "New Penology" (1971) 56 IowA L. REV. 1251;
W. B. Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: a Manual for Pris-
oners' Rights Litigation (1971) 23 STAN. L. REV. 473; J. D. Blackburn,
Note: Prison Discipline and the Eighth Amendment: A Psychological Per-
spective (1974) 43 U. CIN. L. REV. iox; H. M. Mckeown and M. W.
Midyette III, Comment: Cruel But Not So Unusual Punishment: The Role
of the Federal Judiciary in State Prison Reform (1976) 7 CUMB. L. REV.
31; I. P. Robbins and M. Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confine-
ment: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State
Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment (1977) 29 STAN. L.
REV. 893; M. S. Feldberg, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An
Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform (977) 12 HARv. Civ. RTS. -
Civ. LiB. L. REV. 367; T. Benjamin and K. Lux: Solitary Confinement as
Psychological Punishment (1977) 13 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 265; C. H.
Sitterson, Conditions of Confinement For Administratively Segregated Prison-
ers (1977) 55 N.C. L. REV. 473.
72 See Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Alabama v. Pugh 438 U.S. 781
(1978). See also Feldberg, id.; R. P. Dick, Comment: Prison Reform in the
Federal Courts (1978) 27 BuFFALo L. REV. 99; Complex Enforcement:
Unconstitutional Prison Conditions (5981) 94 HAav. L. REV. 626.
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Supreme Court of Canada in Martineau No. 27" has already made
it clear that prison decisions may be subject to judicial review where
there is a failure to comply with the duty to act fairly which results
in serious injustice. In the Solosky 4 decision the Court has indicated
that judicial review of prison rules is appropriate to ensure that in
the formulation and application of those rules an appropriate bal-
ance is made between the fundamental civil rights of a prisoner
which have not been taken away expressly or implicitly by statute
and the need to maintain institutional order. It is suggested that a
broad approach to section 12 based on the application of the Mc-
Intyre-Laskin tests can properly be viewed as a vital part of the
judicial armoury to ensure that the rule of law runs behind prison
walls.
73 Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board (No. 2) [ig8o] i S.C.R.
6o2, (1979) 50 C.C.C. (2d) 353.
74 Solosky v. The Queen (979) 50 C.C.C. (2d) 495.
